Justin Logan
Like many think tank dorks, I find the practice of politics often gross and inscrutable. We dorks like calm, boring, rational analysis, and often don’t understand the personal and stylistic tics of politicians. And, of course, Donald Trump is not like most politicians.
But I found myself reflecting on the Trump administration’s style in light of the recent US-Europe fracas, which began with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s visit to Brussels, proceeded through Vice President JD Vance’s speech in Munich, then came into full bloom in the dustup with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office a few weeks ago.
The Trump administration has hammered home the point that Europeans are taking Americans for a ride by shirking in the provision of their own defense. What’s interesting is that US policymakers have tried polite, genteel, but firm remonstrations with Europe for decades, and they have produced little change. Consider:
Robert Gates, 2010:
The demilitarization of Europe — where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it — has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st century.
Robert Gates, 2011:
For all but a handful of allies, defense budgets… have been chronically starved for adequate funding for a long time, with the shortfalls compounding on themselves each year…
The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense. Nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets.
Barack Obama doing a bit better, 2016:
“Free riders aggravate me,” he [said]. Recently, Obama warned that Great Britain would no longer be able to claim a “special relationship” with the United States if it did not commit to spending at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense. “You have to pay your fair share,” Obama told David Cameron, who subsequently met the 2 percent threshold.
Contrast this with the results after Hegseth’s, Vance’s, and Trump’s and Vance’s forceful, clear style. What have the Europeans done, just in the past few weeks?
The EU’s Rearm Europe initiative opens the door to €650 billion in relief from Stability and Growth Pact restrictions on debt, in addition to providing €150 billion in financing for new weapons.
Even more astounding, the German parliament just approved a €1 trillion infrastructure and defense package paid for by… debt. (If you know anything about German politics, to say they have a debt allergy is understating things.) There are a hundred different ways the Germans could screw up the translation of this money into military power, but it’s a lot of money and it will have an impact on European defense even if they make a hash of spending it.
Again—complaining about European cheap-riding isn’t new. Trump’s style is new. When Americans whined about Europe before, in the accepted terms and without an “…or else” at the end of the sentence, they didn’t get results. Trump’s uncouth, impertinent approach is getting results. The Europeans believe he means business.
